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The need for long-term fiscal projections is self evident. Of these projections, pension expenditure is one of the
most important since firstly it represents a large share of total expenditure, and secondly because of the positive
correlation between this variable and demographic ageing. In this paper, we develop a model to project contributory
pension expenditures in the Spanish Social Security System disaggregating the results by pension category, social
security regime and sex. 
The most salient of the results obtained is the expected steady growth of total expenditure in contributory pensions.
This would lie around 15% of GDP around 2045 compared to its initial level of barely 8% even though the baseli-
ne scenario incorporates a substantial recovery of employment and female participation rates. By pension catego-
ries, retirement pensions are those that determine the tendency of total expenditure evolution. Interesting conclu-
sions can also be extracted from the analysis by sex. For instance, even accounting for an increase in female retire-
ment pensions due to their higher participation, the corresponding increase in widow male pensions implies a hig-
her total increase of the total number of contributory pensions accruing to men. 
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projections
The concern about the need to make long-term fiscal projections can be dated back to
the mid-1980s, just when the problem of demographic change began to emerge in industria-
lized countries. Regarding demographic variations, a decline in fertility rates, coupled with
rising longevity, have resulted in a gradual ageing of the overall population. At that moment,
the ratio of the elderly to working-age population was increasing fast in most Western coun-
tries, and the long-term projections of population gave few grounds for optimism (Franco
and Munzi, 1996). The great responsiveness of the pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension systems
to population ageing foreshadowed problems of sustainability of the public finances in these
countries (Heller et al., 1986). This is the consequence of two facts. On the one hand, the
decrease in the number of workers as a result of the low fertility since eighties, and on the
other hand, the considerable increase of the life expectancy that will affect the large baby-
boom generation after 2020. 
Many other public policies, including health and long-term care, are also clearly affec-
ted by this demographic change since their expenditure is highly dependent on the structure
of the population. Concern about future prospects has invaded the political sphere beyond
academic debate. In fact, the European Commission has created the Ageing Working Group
devoted to analyze the future evolution of age-related expenditure and evaluate the need for
reform1. Nevertheless, the responsiveness of PAYG pension systems to population ageing
that was mentioned above, highlights the need to forecast in more detail the future evolution
of these systems in order to evaluate possible reforms. This explains why, all along, the main
subject embodied in age-related projections has been the public pensions systems. This fact
is self-explanatory given the temporal nature of this expenditure and its quantitative impor-
tance within the national budgets. It must also be taken into account that in the European
Union, public PAYG pension systems represent the most important income source for the
elderly, covering about a 90% of retirement income provision.
The basic content of the public spending projections consists in modelling and assessing
the annual forecasted budget cost for the main age-related expenditure programs, from a
long-term perspective. As Franco et al. (2006) distinguish, these fiscal projections have
followed two lines of research: most studies have provided projections of the ratio of some
age-related expenditure to GDP, whereas other studies have pursued to get synthetic indica-
tors of the long-term fiscal performance. 
Ideally, pension expenditure simulations should be based on general equilibrium models
that provide a fully microfounded representation of reality, and allow for endogenizing key
economic variables like wage and other factor returns. Thus, the overlapping generations
model emerges as the most adequate tool to analyse pension expenditure, as it combines indi-
vidual optimization with interaction between generations. Nevertheless, the usual trade off
between aplicability and theoretical consistency applies and, in practise, large scale general
equilibrium models coexist with different kinds of simulation models. The later sacrifice to
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is partially (behavioural models) or totally (non-behavioural models) eliminated. 
In fact, the literature on pensions expenditure modelling is somehow fractioned at the
moment. Toghether with large scale applied overlapping generations models, microsimula-
tion models emerge, which  have necessarily a macroeconomic module. On the other hand,
simple aggregate accounting models have evolved, including more heterogeneity and beco-
ming very similar to non-behavioural microsimulation models2. In parallel generational
accounting, an applied tecnique derived from overlapping generations models, has been used
in that context or in a partial equilibrium context, becoming also similar to a static microsi-
mulation model.
With respect to general equilibrium models, macro-micro simulation models permit to
take advantatge of available micro data sets and a more detailed consideration of legal insti-
tutions and hence policy reforms. In this particular context they also allow a more flexible
introduction of changing labour market conditions like employment recovery and increasing
female participation. Within simulation models, the availability of data and the computatio-
nal capability determine the possibility of both endogenizing behaviour and taking into
account the heterogeneity of economic agents. 
These simulation models usually consist of several modules. The first one involves pro-
jecting the evolution of population using demographic scenarios. Generally, this population
module includes forecasts of survival rates, survivors to each age, deaths at each age, life
table populations and life expectancy for males and females all by single year of age. These
estimates are usually constructed from the mortality rates previously calculated. In this res-
pect, the methodology for calculating the evolution of population by cohorts and gender is
crucial to the success of pension expenditure projections. On that matter, see Lee and
Tuljapurkar (2001) and HM Treasury (2005). 
A second module deals with the pension system institutional aspects, like the existence
of different types of contributory pensions (i.e., retirement, disability and survivors pen-
sions), eligibility requirements, the initial pension benefit as well as other legal features
determining the entry pension formula and the updating rules of pensions.
Lastly, a third module defines the macroeconomic framework applicable in the projec-
tion-horizon. Unlike the simplest models, which only confine to establish the predicted evo-
lution of the main economic variables, there is a growing use of models which yield this fore-
cast under the definition of relations among macroeconomic variables in accordance with
basic postulates of economic theory. In fact, many of the current projection models allow to
obtain the GDP growth rate taking population changes into consideration and its influence
according to labour participation rate and labour productivity. Labour supply modelling is
even incorporated in some models, as the Norwegian MOSART (Fredriksen and Stolen,
2005). 
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microsimulation models. Obviously, the later allow for more interactions between economic
and demographic factors during the projection-horizon. Essentially, the most valuable con-
tribution of the dynamic microsimulation models is its potentiality for incorporating the
effects induced by behavioural changes of individuals or families as a result of public policy
reforms. A complete review of these models can be found in Gruber and Wise (2004) and
Zaidi and Rake (2001). The long experience in using administrative micro data places the
Scandinavian countries as pionners in the building of this type of long-term projection
models (see Fredriksen, 1998; and Fredriksen et al., 2005). 
Other type of models developed over recent years have a stochastic nature. Based on his-
torical data, these models incorporate random variables to forecast the annual changes in the
demographic process, operating through the number of births by gender, the number of
marriages and divorces and the inmigrant flow, all by age-group and gender. Its main contri-
bution is to offer expenditure forecasts based on iterated simulations of the model as an alter-
native for reducing the uncertainty about the input assumptions and its sensitivity. Meyerson
and Sobelhaus (2000) describe the main features of the stochastic pension projection model
prepared by the US Congressional Budget Office.
One of the most important challenges in long-term pension spending modelling is how to
include sources of heterogeneity that permit to differentiate among agents depending on their
ages, productivity, probability of employment, etc. Its inclusion in the model results in more
accurate projections, but at the cost of increasing complexity and data needs (Jimeno et al.,
2006). Traditional models usually take into account heterogeneity in age only, but overlook age-
related aspects as heterogeneity in productivity despite that they are more relevant for wages.
This matter is even more complex because other factors, such as education by cohorts or state
of health are also endogenous3. The most important limitation for incorporating this type of dif-
ferentiation is the requirement of high-quality data. Nevertheless, advances in computational
software and the ever-increasing micro databases permit to be optimistic on this matter. 
In this paper we develop a non-behavioural microsimulation model to project the pen-
sion expenditure for the Spanish contributory system for the period 2004-2050. Regarding
technical design of the model, the main contributions relate to pensioners’ heterogeneity,
specifically in terms of category of pension (i.e. retirement, disability and survivors), social
security regime and gender. With respect to other projection models applied to the Spanish
system (Jimeno, 2003), this model deals with the whole contributory social security system.
Furthermore, in contrast to Balmaseda et al. (2006) and Alonso and Herce (2003) our model
explicitly links the projection of retirement pensions to the rest of contributory pensions. In
fact, the number of retirement pensions as well as the pension benefit itself drive the evolu-
tion of widow and other survivors pensions. The fact that disability pensioners become reti-
rees when reaching 65 years is also explicitly taken into account.
We also analyze gender differences in pensions. In particular we account for the entry of
women in the labour market and the corresponding adjustment of female average pension
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ture projections in so far as we capture the gaps associated with both the participation rate
and the pension benefit. Besides, the projection model clearly specifies the way the demo-
graphic and macroeconomic modules interact with the institutional aspects module. This
allows carrying out meaningful sensitivity analysis using alternative scenarios on growth
productivity, labour market participation and relevant demographic aspects as the number of
immigrants. We also provide a synthetic indicator of fiscal sustainability, which allows for
summarizing in a single figure the overall sustainability of the system as well as the effects
or different scenarios. Finally, dissagregation by regime allows us to account for special ten-
dencies in the number of pensions or the average pension benefits. An outstanding example
in the Spanish system is a special regime for retirement pensions which pays a fixed pension
and which beneficiaries are expected to disappear by the end of the 2030-decade.    
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 a description of the contributory
pension system in Spain is provided. The projection model is presented in Section 3, and the
demographic and macroeconomic scenarios in Section 4. Sections 5 and 6 are devoted to pre-
sent the main results of the projection model as well as some sensitivity analysis. Finally,
Section 7 summarizes the main conclusions.
2. The contributory pension system: institutional framework
The Spanish contributory pension system is organised on a pay-as-you-go basis under a
defined-benefit scheme. Workers and pensioners are classified into different regimes (i.e.,
the General Regime and five Special Regimes like Self-Employment, Agrarian, Coal
Mining, Sea Workers and Domestic Employees)4 covering a set of contingencies: retirement,
permanent disability and survival pensions (e.g., widow, orphan and family pensions). The
nature of the contributory pension system relies basically on two characteristics: first, a
minimum period of contribution payments is required (as long as other conditions are met)
and, second, the pension benefits determined by the past wages of the worker. In the follo-
wing we present the main characteristics of each pension category.
a) Contributory retirement pension
The contributory retirement pension is an economic benefit of indefinite duration and
covers the loss of income suffered by a person who, after ending his working career, reaches
the retirement condition. The beneficiaries are affiliated workers (or under a situation assi-
milated to being affiliated) who meet the legally established conditions of a) retirement, nor-
mally at age 65, and b) a minimum period of 15 years of contribution, although 2 years must
belong to the 15 years period immediately before retirement.
The initial retirement pension benefit is determined by applying the corresponding per-
centage (that depends on the number of contribution years) to the Regulating Base (hereaf-
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contribution bases of the last 15 years.5 The percentage which is applied to the RB to dedu-
ce the initial retirement pension benefit is variable according to the number of years contri-
buted to Social Security: 50% if the worker accredits 15 years of contributions, and it is
increased by 3% for each additional year between the sixteenth and twenty fifth year and by
2% from the twenty sixth year until it reaches 100% at 35 years of payments. A differential
treatment is given to workers with contributions before and after January 1st 1967, since a
Spain’s true modern public insurance system begins its development from 1967 on.
Moreover, there is an incentive for a prolonged working career: for workers aged 65 and over
the percentage to be applied to the RB increases an additional 2% as long as the worker can
accredit 35 years of contribution.
Retirement pensions are subject to upper and lower limits annually determined by the
Government’s General Budget Act. Minimum pensions are guaranteed according to age and
family responsibilities. Additionally, the system guarantees by law the real value of pensions
since they are increased, at the start of each year, according to the predicted Consumer Price
Index (hereafter CPI). 
Ordinary retirement age in Spain is at 65, although there are exceptions to this general
rule and retirement age can be reduced in some special cases: a) early retirement, b) special
retirement at age 64, c) partial and flexible retirement, d) retirement of certain collectives,
and e) retirement of disabled workers. Most notably, early retirement from the age of 60 was
an option just reserved to those workers who had been contributors in any of the Employment
Mutual before January 1st 1967. In this case, the early retirement pension benefit is compu-
ted applying to the RB a specific reduction percentage that depends on the number of con-
tribution years. However, after the approval of the Law 35/2002, of July 12th, workers
without being insured or having contributed in a Mutual Society or Mutuality before January
1st 1967, can only retire from 61 on under certain conditions6.
b) Contributory disability pension
The objective of the contributory disability pension is to provide a social safety net
against income losses associated with a total or partial loss of capability to work. Benefits
are contingent upon the origin and the degree of disability, as well as the type of recipient.
Four types or degrees of permanent disability are considered, nonetheless it is worth mentio-
ning that the former gives right to a lump sum indemnification, while the compensations
from the latter three take the form of a lifetime annuity. In any event, in case of a worker not
reaching the minimum retirement age the legislation establishes that the disability may be
subject to a revision as a consequence of a worsening or an improvement of the degree of
disability or because of eventual misdiagnoses. Should we also mention that by 1997 disabi-
lity pension recipients older than 65 years are categorized as retirement pensioners (with no
effect on their compensations or benefits). Moreover, beyond that age no disability report is
allowed. 
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Under this category worker’s efficiency is supposed to have been reduced by no less than
33%, nonetheless he is still capable of performing the fundamental tasks the usual occupa-
tion requires. The compensation consists of a lump sum transfer (which means it is not a pen-
sion) equivalent to 24 times the RB, which served to determine the temporal disability com-
pensation. Since it is not a pension it is not taken into account in the forecast analysis. 
The second degree is total permanent disability for the usual occupation (TPD). In this
case the worker is incapable of performing all or the fundamental tasks of his usual occupa-
tion, but yet can attend other kind of occupation. The eligibility criteria depend on the cause
of disability (common disease, non workplace accident or causes attributable to the occupa-
tion) and the compensation consists of a lifetime annuity that represents 55% of the RB (this
is augmented up to 75% of the RB once the worker has turned 55 and is jobless). The RB is
determined again by the origin of the disability, or by the minimum contribution period
required, whenever this one is applicable. 
The third degree is an absolute permanent disability for any type of occupation (PAD).
Under this category the worker is totally inhibited from taking on any occupation or activity.
As in PTD, the eligibility criteria depend on the cause of disability. The benefit consists of a
lifetime annuity that represents 100% of the RB. Finally, complete disability (CD) implies a
total inhibition from taking on any occupation or activity and the worker needs other people-
’s assistance to carry out the basic daily living activities. Eligibility criteria for compensation
are the same as in the PTD case. The benefit amounts to 100% of the RB with a 50% incre-
ment for the person in charge (such an increment may be traded for room and board in a
public institution financed by the Social Security Administration). 
c) Contributory survivors’ pensions
Contributory survivor’s pensions include those pensions paid to widows and orphans
(and where appropriate, other dependants) in order to compensate the financial needs of cer-
tain people. The originators of the widow pension are affiliated workers with a minimum
contribution period and retired pensioners who receive contributory benefits or pensioners
with permanent disability. The beneficiaries of the widow pension are: the surviving spouse
(either female or male) and the separated and divorced people who have not remarried, in
which case the pension benefit will be proportional to the time lived as a married couple with
the deceased.
Under certain circumstances, the widow pension is compatible with the income obtained
from the beneficiary’s work and with the retirement or permanent disability pension. The
pension benefit is obtained by applying the following percentages: a) in general, a 52% on
the RB or b) a qualified 70% on the corresponding RB whenever the some requirements are
met for the entire period in which the beneficiaries receive the pension7.
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was an active worker or a pensioner, and on whether cause of death was a professional con-
tingency or not: a) if the deceased was a retired or a permanent disabled pensioner, the RB
is the same as it was used to determine the originator’s initial pension benefit, but increased
by the cumulated revaluations for the widowhood pensions8; b) if the deceased was an acti-
ve worker, two main situations can be distinguished, according to whether the death was due
to common contingencies or due to work-related injury or occupational disease.
Nevertheless, there are some specific rules for part-time, relief and permanent-intermittent
contracts. 
Widow pensions are also subject to upper and lower limits fixed by the Government’s
General Budget Act. At the beginning of each year, the annual pension benefits are adjusted
based on the CPI forecast for that year. The right to collect this pension can end by different
causes besides mortality9. 
With regard to orphan pensions the originators are the same as for widowhood pensions,
and the beneficiaries are their children under age 18. It also includes the children under 22
years old, or 24 if none of the parents survive, under some circumstances. Importantly, the
pension benefit for orphans is calculated by applying a 20% on the same RB as for wido-
whood benefits. The orphan pension is compatible with any income from work if the orphan
is under 18 (or has reduced working capabilility). Lastly, the orphan pension benefit will end
when beneficiary reaches age 22, except in special circumstances related to disability, adop-
tion and marriage.
3. The model
This section develops the simulation model. The starting point takes into account that
total pension expenditure in year t (TEt) is the result of multiplying the number of pensions
during that year (NPAt) by the average pension benefit (pmt):
TEt = NPAt  . pmt [3.1]
To obtain the number of pensions throughout a year t, it is important to recognize that
these can belong to three different types: a) those received throughout the year, named com-
mon pensions (Ct), that is, those that were already granted on January 1st and have not cau-
sed withdrawal from Social Security by December 31st; b) the new registrations (NRt), i.e.,
those pensions that were started to be received at some point in year t; and c) the withdra-
wals that correspond to year t (Wt), i.e., those that were no longer received during that year,
at some point before December 31st. 
Total pension expenditure for a year is thus the sum of the pension benefits correspon-
ding to the three categories. Now, the new registrations and withdrawals do not receive the
total benefits for the whole year under consideration, just one part is granted. Assuming that
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they will be received during one half of the year10. That way, the equivalent number of pen-
sions during the year t (NPAt), which is the relevant variable in [3.1], can be obtained as:
NPAt = Ct + 0,5NRt + 0,5Wt [3.2]
The computation of NPAt requires previous knowledge of the number of pensions of
each type (C, NR and W). Since the data on the number of pensions always refers to a speci-
fic date, generally December 31st of each year, they are not readily usable for this projection
model. Let NPt be the number of existing pensions as of December 31st of the year t, and let
NPt+1 be the same variable for the next period. It can then be assumed that:
NPt+1 = NPt + NRt+1  Wt+1 [3.3]
That is, starting from the number of pensions at the end of year t, those for the year t+1
can be computed by summing up the new registrations and then subtracting the withdrawals
for that year. To do so, it is necessary to have a projection of the number of new registrations
and withdrawals for that period. In turn, the number of common pensions in t+1 can be obtai-
ned from the difference between the number of existing pensions at the end of t+1 and the
withdrawals during t+1, that is11:
Ct = NPt  Wt+1 [3.4]
Once the new registrations and the withdrawals have been projected and the common
pensions computed (as is given by [3.4]), the relevant variable for the estimation, the num-
ber of pensions throughout the period (NPA), can be obtained using [3.2].
The average pension benefit for a given period is to be computed from the correspon-
ding weighted average pension benefits of the different collectives (common, new registra-
tions, and withdrawals). Denoting pmct, pmnrt, and pmwt the average pension benefits of the
common, the new registrations, and the withdrawals, respectively, the average pension bene-
fit can be obtained as:
pmt  [3.5]
or alternatively,
pmt = dt pmct + at pmnrt + bt pmwt [3.6]
where dt, at, bt represent each pension type as a proportion of NPAt:
dt = ; at = ; bt = [3.7]
From now on, the projection model incorporates heterogeneity of beneficiaries, disag-
gregating by pension category, contribution regime to Social Security, age, and gender. The
0,5Wt
Ct + 0,5NRt + 0,5Wt
0,5NRt
Ct + 0,5NRt + 0,5Wt
Ct
Ct + 0,5NRt + 0,5Wt
Ct pmct + 0,5NRt pmnrt + 0,5BWt pmwt
Ct + 0,5NRt + 0,5Wt
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new registrations for each period, as well as the average pension. The projection of the with-
drawals and their corresponding average pension benefit will depend greatly on the new
registrations estimation, the number of existing pensions at the end of the previous period, as
well as their respective average pension benefits. At the same time, the withdrawals and their
corresponding average pension will determine the number of common pensions and their
average pension benefit, along with the number of pensions at the end of the previous period
and their respective average pension benefit.
3.1. Retirement
The projection of retirement pension expenditure derives from the distribution of the
number of pensions by gender and age cohorts as of December 31st of 2003 (base year) for
each contribution regime (MTAS, 2004).
a) Projection of the number of pensions
Starting from the distribution by gender and age cohorts of the pension benefits in the
base year, the projection of the new registrations is implemented in accordance with the fore-
casted labour participation rate by gender and age cohorts in the macroeconomic scenario.
In that manner, the evolution of the Social Security coverage ratio (the ratio of the number
of retirement pensions to the population of more than 65 years of age) is linked to the evo-
lution of the labour market participation rate. In the projection, it is necessary to discern the
new registrations subject to a coefficient of correction when computing their pension bene-
fit (anticipated or differed retirement).
To obtain the projection of the withdrawals, the expected mortality rates by gender and
age cohorts as obtained from the demographic scenario are applied to the number of existing
pension benefits at the beginning of the period (end of the previous period). They are also
applied to the number of new registrations projected throughout the year. 
Once the new registrations and withdrawals for the corresponding year have been pro-
jected, the projection of common pensions is made using [3.4]. The equivalent number of
pensions throughout the period (NPAt) is then estimated using [3.2]. Finally, using [3.3] the
number of pension benefits at the end of the year (NPt), which is necessary for the projec-
tion in the subsequent period, is obtained.
b) Projection of the average pension
The computation of the average pension of the new registrations is based on the legally
warranted formula: 
pmnrt = (1  p) · p(n) · RB (CBt, CBt1,..., CBt15) [3.8]
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(CB) of the last fifteen of contribution years12, p(n) is the percentage applied on the RB that
depends on the number of contribution years, and p is the applicable coefficient of correc-
tion in the event of anticipated or differed retirement. 
We start the projection by estimating the number of contribution years (n) for the retire-
ment pensions from the data on the average contribution years of the retirement pensioners.
Since the objective is to obtain pensions projection by gender, the separate evolution of the
contribution base for men and women is necessary. Because of the unavailability of such a
disaggregation, the following strategy has been adopted. Firstly, it is considered that the gap
between average pensions of new registrations of men and women is the same as the one
observed in the whole system. Secondly, it is assumed that the evolution of the gap will
follow the same time trend as that of the participation gap. That is, the average retirement
pension of female new registrations will approach that of their male counterparts as the rate
of labour market participation of the former comes close to that of the latter during the pro-
jection period.
The average pensions of the withdrawals and the common pensions are obtained as a
weighted average of the average pensions of the two possible collectives of origin in each
case. That way, the withdrawals per year occur between the number of existing pensions at
the end of the previous year and the new registrations for that year13. Consequently, the ave-
rage pension of the withdrawals will be a weighted average of the average pension of the pre-
vious year (pmt1) and the average pension of the new registrations of the period:
pmwt = pmt1 + pmnrt [3.9]
where It stands for the price index. The common pensions in turn, as captured in [3.4], stem
from the number of pensions at the end of the previous year and the withdrawals during the
period. Accordingly, its average pension can be approximated as:
pmct = pmt1 + pmwt [3.10]
Once the average pensions of the new registrations, the withdrawals and the common are
obtained for a given period, the average retirement pension can be found using [3.5]. 
3.2. Permanent disability
As discussed in Section 2, the disability pensions system consists of different compen-
sations and collectives depending on the cause and the degree of disability. Specifically,
three degrees of permanent disability that initially give right to a life annuity are considered:
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ners are classified as retirement pensioners with no effect on their characteristics. New regis-
trations of disability for people aged 65 or more are not filed. Additionally, three possible
causes of the disability that determine the corresponding regulating base are distinguished:
common disease, non-workplace accident, or causes attributable to the professional activity.
Consequently, the projection of the disability pension expenditures requires projecting the
pensioners and the average pension (according to the degree and the cause of the disability)
alike. Again, the projection starts from the disability pensions as of December 31st of 2003
(MTAS, 2004) distributed by gender, the contribution regime, the degree and the cause of the
disability15.
a) Projection of the number of pensions
To project the new registrations for each level of disaggregation, we use the disability
rates by age cohort, gender, contribution regime, degree and cause of disability that are obtai-
ned from the initial distribution of the new registrations. The disability rates are defined as
the new registrations for every thousand of active worker in the base year. They are kept
constant during the projection period, given their good behaviour in the last years, which has
put them in acceptable levels when compared to those of the surrounding countries16.
As to the projection of the withdrawals, in the case of disability pensions consideration
of a second cause of withdrawals besides mortality is necessary, i.e., the loss of compensa-
tion rights after a diagnosis reassessment. The withdrawals for reassessment for each gender
and age cohort are a percentage of the surviving pensioners in each group. This percentage
is obtained by comparing the number of pensioners observed at the end of each year with the
one that would be obtained if the unique cause of withdrawal from the system were the mor-
tality rate17.
From the new registrations and withdrawals in each period we obtain the number of com-
mon pensioners using [3.3] and [3.4]. Finally, the value of NPA for each projection year is
derived from [3.2].
b) Projection of the average pension
To compute the average pension benefit for the new registrations we start with the
legally established formula, which consists in applying a percentage (π) to the regulating
base (RB). This percentage is determined by the degree of disability,18 while the RB is com-
puted from the past contribution bases depending on the cause. Consequently, the average
pension benefit of the new registrations for disability is obtained as a weighted average of
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lity, respectively. To differentiate the projection of the average pension benefit of the new regis-
trations by gender, the same procedure used with retirement pensions is followed. Also, to pro-
ject the average pensions of the withdrawals and the common pensioners, expressions [3.9]
and [3.10] are used. Finally, the average pension benefit for disability is obtained from [3.5].
3.3. Survivors
As was pointed out in Section 2, survivor’s benefits are designed to make up for the
financial necessity that some individuals experience due to the death of others. Three cate-
gories of pensions are considered depending on the beneficiary: widowhood, orphanhood
and other surviving relatives’ benefits.
a) Projection of the number of pensions
In the case of survivors’pensions, there exists no reason to link its evolution to the par-
ticipation rate (as is the case for retirement pensions). On the contrary, in the case of wido-
whood, it can be assumed that this evolution will be correlated with the withdrawals that take
place in the retirement and disability pensions, as well as in the active population. In that res-
pect, the widowhood new registrations for each gender in every period are computed in rela-
tion to the withdrawals of the retired opposite gender, as well as to the withdrawals as a con-
sequence of mortality of the active population and the withdrawals of disability pensions. For
the base year, an adjustment factor between the result obtained via this method of projection
and the one observed is computed. This adjustment factor will be applied for all the years of
projection. 
In the case of orphanhood and family pensions, there exists an additional difficulty, since
new registrations cannot be linked to the withdrawals in retirement and disability or morta-
lity of the active population by age cohorts. For that reason, the total number of new regis-
trations in the base year is distributed by age cohort and gender following the available dis-
tribution pattern for total pensions of the same category. Then, the ratio of new registrations
to total beneficiaries by age cohort and gender are obtained and are kept constant all through
the projection period.
b) Projection of the average pension
The average pension benefit of widowhood new registrations is 52% of the regulating
base that causes the benefit19. For orphan’s pensions and other surviving relatives’benefits,
except under special circumstances, this percentage goes down to 20%. Three possible cau-
ses of benefit are to be taken into consideration to obtain the regulating base: participant in
the labour market, retired, or disabled. The regulating base is obtained as a weighted avera-
ge of the respective regulating bases, the weights being the proportions of new registrations
A projection model of the contributory pension expenditure of the spanish social security system: 2004-2050 87estimated for each of the three causes just mentioned. As to survivors’new registrations due
to labour-market participants’ mortality, the regulating base can be obtained directly from
the average contribution bases of the active population by age cohort. However, when the
new registrations are the consequence of retired or disabled mortality, it is impossible to
know the regulating base that caused the pension benefit. In these two cases, the ratio of the
average pension of the retired and disabled new registrations to the average pension of sur-
vivors new registrations, computed for the base year, is used and is kept constant all through
the period.
4. Demographic and macroeconomic scenarios
The projection model described above will produce results once introduced the evolu-
tion scenarios of the relevant demographic and macroeconomic variables. The scenarios
adopted for the baseline projection are those elaborated for Spain by Eurostat (2005) (demo-
graphic scenario) and the Economic Policy Committee (EPC, 2006) (macroeconomic scena-
rio). Their main traits are described next.
4.1. Demographic scenario
Population projections are carried out using three main hypotheses related to the evo-
lution of the fertility rate, of life expectancy, and of the net migration flows. The projec-
tion implemented by Eurostat until 2050 is made by gender and age cohort, assuming that
Spain will slightly recover its fertility rates during the period, although they will still be
below the European Union average. So, in 2050 Spanish fertility rate will reach 1.4 chil-
dren per women, while for the EU it will be 1.65. As to the life expectancy, a gradual incre-
ase for both men and women is also expected, about 4 and 5 years respectively respect the
current value.
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Figure 4.1. Demographic scenario: evolution of fertility and life expectancy
Source: Own elaboration from Eurostat (2005).As far as migration is concerned, Eurostat’s hypothesis is as follows: net migration flows
will be stabilized at the end of this decade at a number slightly superior to 100,000 per year.
This is a controversial hypothesis since during the last years net migration flows have been
around 500,000 per year. In fact, Spain’s Statistical Office (Instituto Nacional de Estadística,
INE) has made alternative projections with net migration flows well above 250,000 per year.
Although we will keep the EUROSTAT scenario to obtain de baseline results, the alternati-
ve high migration scenario elaborated by the INE will be also considered in the sensitivity
analysis in order to account for possible differences.
As can be observed in Figure 4.2, Eurostat’s projections exhibit a strong ageing tendency
of the Spanish population for the 2050 horizon. Specifically, after a sustained increase from
its original 24.6%, the dependency rate (ratio of population aged 65 years and more to poten-
tial labour-market participants aged between 16 and 64) will be above 66%.
4.2. Macroeconomic scenario
The main hypotheses of the macroeconomic scenario projected by the EPC for Spain
are those that relate to the evolution of the GDP, the productivity growth rate, and the
labour market variables (participation rates and unemployment rates). For the GDP,
although with a slowdown between 2020 and 2040, a positive growth rate is expected for
the whole projection period. A more stable evolution of productivity growth is expected,
going from the present low rates (around 0.5%) to 2% until 2020. From there, it would
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Figure 4.2. Demographic scenario: evolution of the population composition by age
Source: Own elaboration from Eurostat (2005).decrease to remain at around 1.7% from 2030 on. This turns out to be a relevant assump-
tion given that even a small recovery lasts for the whole projection period raising the GDP
for each future year. 
The persistence of high unemployment rates and low female participation rates shape
the evolution of the Spanish labour market. A salient feature of the macroeconomic sce-
nario is precisely the increase of the female participation rate, particularly until 2020. In
the baseline scenario, female participation will grow from 56.8% to 70.4% until 2050. In
turn, aggregate male participation rate in the labour market remains basically unchanged
throughout the whole period at a quite high value (over 80%). It is however important to
mention some particular feature for age cohorts. For instance, youth (both men and
women less than age 24) participation rate slightly declines during the first years of pro-
jection. Nevertheless, female participation rate for the remaining cohorts (up to 64 years)
experiences a substantial increase. Meanwhile, only the 54-64 male age cohorts experien-
ce a higher participation rate, but still lower than that of their female counterpart. It is
important to put into relief that a higher participation rate for the superior age cohorts
(between 65 and 71) is expected for both men and women alike. Their participation rate
would be around 12%, compared with a 4% as of 2004.
The expected evolution of unemployment for both men and women is a constant decli-
ne until it reaches an average value of 6.9% in 2015 (about 5.3% for men and 8.7% for
women), which will basically remain unchanged until the end of the projection period.
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Figure 4.3. Macroeconomic scenario: GDP evolution












































































Figure 4.4. Macroeconomic scenario: evolution of participation rates











































































Figure 4.5. Macroeconomic scenario: evolution of unemployment rates
Source: Own elaboration from EPC (2006).5. Baseline results
In this section the results of the projection model of contributory pension expenditu-
re in Spain using the demographic and macroeconomic scenarios described above are pre-
sented. 
5.1. Number of pensions 
The evolution of the number of total pensions and pensions by category is illustrated in
Figure 5.1 and Table 5.1. As is shown in Figure 5.1, a sustained growth of contributory pen-
sions is expected at an annual average cumulative rate of 1.3%. That way, in 2050 we would
surpass the 14 million pension threshold, compared with barely 8 million in 2004. This evo-
lution is nonetheless not lineal throughout the projection period. The number of pensions
would grow at approximately 1% until the beginning of the 2020s. From that moment, with
the retirement of the baby-boomers, the most populated cohorts, the rate of growth would
double. From 2040 on, the rate of growth decreases to even become negative by 2047. From
Figure 5.1, it is straightforward to notice that retirement pensions are responsible for the
observed tendency of total pensions, since the other benefits (disability and survivors) exhi-
bit a much more stable tendency. In fact, as can be seen in Table 5.1, the importance of the
retirement pensions with respect to total contributory pensions exhibits a continuous growth
in detriment of the other categories (in 2050 they represent more than 71%, against 58.6%
in 2004). 










































































































Disability Retirement Survivors Total
Figure 5.1. Evolution of the number of contributory pensions by category
Note: Figures are expressed in thousand of beneficiaries.
Source: Own elaboration.The projection analysis by gender allows drawing some interesting results. On the one
hand, the total number of pensions accruing to both men and women is very similar in the
base year, although a clearly differentiated structure can be observed by pension category. In
that vein, male retirement pensions are substantially more numerous, while disability pen-
sions rank second (respectively, 77.5% and 14.2% in 2004). Female widowhood pensions in
turn outweigh those for retirement (more than 50% versus 39.3% in 2004).
The projection also shows differentiated tendencies in its future evolution. The total
number of contributory pensions will grow proportionately more for men. Specifically, on
average some 1.5% annual cumulative over the period, versus 1.1% for their female counter-
part. As a consequence, the number of male pensions will be relatively more important and
would represent 1.3 times those of female in 2050, which brings down the originally obser-
ved equality. 
For both sexes, the retirement pensions are expected to be increasingly important, in par-
ticular for the women, who start off with a relatively inferior weight. For the first part of the
projection, that is, until 2020, the average annual cumulative growth rate is about 1.6% for
men and 1.5% for women. However, this trend is inverted between 2020 and 2050 to beco-
me 2% and 1.8% for women and men, respectively. So, by 2050 the number of retirement
pensions accruing to women would represent approximately 53.2% that going to men, com-
pared with the original 49.6%. Female retirement pensions from the total would grow more
than 17 points with respect to the base year, while it would be a barely 6 points increment
for their male counterpart. 
The widowhood benefits exhibit the reverse trend. The number of male beneficiaries is
expected to grow at approximately an annual cumulative average rate superior to 2.5%, while
this figure would be 0.3% for the female. This result is in line with the assumptions made on
the female labour market participation, which will give greater access to widower’s pensions.
However, at the end of the projection widowhood benefits would continue to be more impor-
tant for women, representing 35.4% of the total female contributory pensions compared with
6.2% for men.  
The growth of the number of pensioners for the remaining pension categories is expec-
ted to be negligible for both sexes and would be below 0.5% annual cumulative average. Both
the disability pensions and the orphan’s pensions and other surviving relatives’benefits lose
importance with respect to total number of pensions for both sexes. 
Finally, it is important to notice that this expected evolution for the number of pen-
sions appears to be a corollary of the starting demographic scenario, where a clear ten-
dency of population ageing is observed, as well as the assumptions on the evolution of the
labour market. In effect, the increase in participation rates has a direct impact on the incre-
ase of the retirement pension coverage rate (ratio of the number of pensions to the popu-
lation over 65 years), which in fact goes from 64.1% in 2004 to about 70% around 2040
(Figure 5.2).
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EVOLUTION OF THE NUMBER OF PENSIONS BY GENDER AND CLASS 
(IN NUMBER AND AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL)
Both sexes
Retirement Disability Widow Other TOTAL
2004 4,625,846 58.6% 817,392 10.4% 2,135,325 27.0% 318,708 4.0% 7,897,270
2005 4,677,186 58.2% 861,993 10.7% 2,166,665 27.0% 324,167 4.0% 8,030,012
2010 4,985,975 58.7% 951,648 11.2% 2,207,785 26.0% 342,866 4.0% 8,488,274
2015 5,430,056 60.1% 1,028,599 11.4% 2,239,406 24.8% 343,637 3.8% 9,041,698
2020 5,963,505 61.5% 1,124,639 11.6% 2,244,018 23.2% 357,601 3.7% 9,689,762
2025 6,750,004 63.7% 1,193,017 11.2% 2,285,842 21.6% 376,000 3.5% 10,604,864
2030 7,772,770 66.0% 1,223,497 10.4% 2,395,419 20.3% 385,036 3.3% 11,776,722
2035 8,805,681 68.1% 1,208,128 9.3% 2,533,406 19.6% 383,106 3.0% 12,930,320
2040 9,737,186 70.2% 1,130,660 8.2% 2,626,274 18.9% 376,495 2.7% 13,870,616
2045 10,391,688 71.7% 1,015,547 7.0% 2,715,873 18.7% 370,930 2.6% 14,494,038
2050 10,322,379 71.9% 944,581 6.6% 2,721,686 19.0% 366,625 2.6% 14,355,270
Male
Retirement Disability Widow Other TOTAL
2004 3,092,548 77.5% 566,647 14.2% 159,953 4.0% 172,204 4.3% 3,991,351
2005 3,135,543 77.0% 595,107 14.6% 169,456 4.2% 174,062 4.3% 4,074,168
2010 3,368,448 76.4% 646,954 14.7% 210,653 4.8% 183,260 4.2% 4,409,315
2015 3,669,950 76.4% 692,149 14.4% 257,922 5.4% 184,043 3.8% 4,804,064
2020 4,007,087 76.2% 756,304 14.4% 306,387 5.8% 190,928 3.6% 5,260,707
2025 4,475,686 76.7% 803,703 13.8% 356,852 6.1% 200,074 3.4% 5,836,314
2030 5,101,900 78.0% 825,514 12.6% 406,384 6.2% 205,008 3.1% 6,538,806
2035 5,745,454 79.6% 814,274 11.3% 450,137 6.2% 204,901 2.8% 7,214,766
2040 6,352,639 81.5% 760,518 9.8% 478,374 6.1% 203,012 2.6% 7,794,544
2045 6,777,855 83.1% 679,495 8.3% 498,160 6.1% 201,935 2.5% 8,157,444
2050 6,739,224 83.5% 629,827 7.8% 498,543 6.2% 201,079 2.5% 8,068,672
Female
Retirement Disability Widow Other TOTAL
2004 1,533,297 39.3% 250,745 6.4% 1,975,372 50.6% 146,504 3.8% 3,905,919
2005 1,541,643 39.0% 266,887 6.7% 1,997,209 50.5% 150,105 3.8% 3,955,844
2010 1,617,526 39.7% 304,694 7.5% 1,997,132 49.0% 159,606 3.9% 4,078,959
2015 1,760,105 41.5% 336,450 7.9% 1,981,484 46.8% 159,594 3.8% 4,237,633
2020 1,956,417 44.2% 368,334 8.3% 1,937,631 43.7% 166,672 3.8% 4,429,054
2025 2,274,319 47.7% 389,314 8.2% 1,928,991 40.5% 175,927 3.7% 4,768,550
2030 2,670,870 51.0% 397,982 7.6% 1,989,035 38.0% 180,028 3.4% 5,237,916
2035 3,060,227 53.5% 393,854 6.9% 2,083,270 36.4% 178,204 3.1% 5,715,554
2040 3,384,547 55.7% 370,142 6.1% 2,147,900 35.4% 173,483 2.9% 6,076,072
2045 3,613,834 57.0% 336,052 5.3% 2,217,713 35.5% 168,995 2.7% 6,336,594
2050 3,583,155 57.0% 314,753 5.0% 2,223,144 35.4% 165,546 2.6% 6,286,598
Source: Own elaboration.








































































































Figure 5.2. Evolution of retirement pension coverage rate
Source: Own elaboration.
Note: The coverage rate is obtained as the number of pensions divided by the population aged 65 and
more. The coverage rate can be over 100% due to the existence of retirement pensioners under
65 years.
5.2. Average pension benefit
The estimated evolution of the average pension benefit in real terms by gender and cate-
gory, as well as the expected annual growth rates, are shown in Table 5.2.
The evolution of the average pension is differentiated for both pension category and gen-
der (see Figure 5.3). The behaviour of the average pension for the new registrations and the
proportion of new registrations with respect to yearly total pensions are of central salience in
that evolution. This can be seen from [3.5]-[3.7], for the benefits accruing to common pen-
sions and withdrawals are only indexed by the annual inflation rate (applicable to all pension
categories and both sexes). On Figure 5.4, the number of new registrations in relation to total
number of pensions by gender and category are presented for the base year (2004). 
With respect to retirement, the average pension for men starts 1.6 times that of women.
This gap would be reduced to 1.3 in 2050. The greater access of women into the labour mar-
ket, along with the wage equality tendency, are the key factors explaining the breaching of
the gap. Nevertheless, it is important to note that, although a clear tendency of convergence
between men and women average retirement pensions can be observed until 2025, from that
moment this trend is inverted and the gap starts to widen again (see Figure 5.5). Mainly, the
explanation for this evolution lies in the fact that the proportion of new registrations with res-
pect to total pensions each year is greater for men (see Figure 5.4). This is because women96 JOAN GIL, MIGUEL A. LÓPEZ, JORGE ONRUBIA, CIÓ PATXOT, GUADALUPE SOUTO
Table 5.2
PROJECTED EVOLUTION OF THE AVERAGE PENSION BENEFIT AND ITS GROWTH
RATE BY GENDER AND CLASS (AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH RATES)
Both sexes
Retirement Disability Widow Other
2004 673 8.6% 663 0.4% 439 7.0% 247 4.0%
2005 679 0.8% 679 2.4% 452 2.8% 259 4.7%
2010 751 2.0% 756 2.2% 506 2.3% 313 3.8%
2015 781 0.8% 824 1.7% 519 0.5% 395 4.8%
2020 847 1.6% 900 1.8% 540 0.8% 453 2.8%
2025 946 2.2% 980 1.7% 568 1.0% 496 1.8%
2030 1,053 2.2% 1,062 1.6% 595 0.9% 526 1.2%
2035 1,149 1.8% 1,149 1.6% 618 0.7% 548 0.8%
2040 1,267 2.0% 1,235 1.5% 640 0.7% 571 0.8%
2045 1,343 1.2% 1,323 1.4% 650 0.3% 600 1.0%
2050 1,379 0.5% 1,420 1.4% 658 0.2% 635 1.1%
Male
Retirement Disability Widow Other
2004 768 7.5% 715 1.2% 390 4.0% 232 4.3%
2005 771 0.5% 729 2.0% 413 5.6% 242 4.1%
2010 834 1.6% 798 1.8% 499 3.9% 315 5.4%
2015 857 0.5% 862 1.5% 532 1.3% 417 5.8%
2020 917 1.4% 935 1.6% 564 1.2% 487 3.2%
2025 1,017 2.1% 1,013 1.6% 594 1.0% 535 1.9%
2030 1,137 2.2% 1,093 1.5% 617 0.8% 569 1.2%
2035 1,248 1.9% 1,180 1.5% 633 0.5% 594 0.9%
2040 1,380 2.0% 1,269 1.5% 648 0.5% 622 0.9%
2045 1,463 1.2% 1,360 1.4% 654 0.2% 656 1.1%
2050 1,504 0.6% 1,460 1.4% 659 0.2% 696 1.2%
Female
Retirement Disability Widow Other
2004 483 9.3% 546 6.4% 443 0.6% 257 3.8%
2005 492 1.7% 569 4.0% 455 2.7% 270 4.9%
2010 578 3.3% 666 3.2% 506 2.2% 314 3.0%
2015 624 1.6% 746 2.3% 517 0.4% 387 4.3%
2020 705 2.5% 828 2.1% 537 0.8% 441 2.7%
2025 805 2.7% 912 1.9% 564 1.0% 483 1.8%
2030 893 2.1% 997 1.8% 591 1.0% 514 1.2%
2035 964 1.5% 1,083 1.7% 614 0.8% 537 0.9%
2040 1,057 1.9% 1,165 1.5% 638 0.8% 560 0.8%
2045 1,117 1.1% 1,247 1.4% 650 0.4% 587 1.0%
2050 1,143 0.5% 1,340 1.4% 658 0.3% 620 1.1%
Source: Own elaboration.
Note: Figures are expressed in constant euros of 2004 per month without including extraordinary payments.have higher life expectancy and consequently on average they collect pension benefits for
more years than men. And, since the average pension benefit for the new registrations has
less weight when computing the average pension benefit (see [3.6]), this makes the female
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Figure 5.4. New registrations related to the total number of pensions 
by gender and category in 2004
Source: Own elaboration from MTAS (2005).retirement average pension benefit grow at a rate below that of their male counterpart. As is
explained in subsection 3.1, this effect is temporarily counterbalanced to the extent that the
model diminishes the gap between the average pension benefit of the new registrations for
men and women as the participation rates of the macroeconomic scenario become closer. But
even though the participation rates gap is breached substantially between 2004 and 2020,
from that moment the closing rate is quite inferior. All this provokes a renewed increase of
the total gap between sexes for all the beneficiaries, besides the fact that the gap for average
pension benefits that correspond to the new registrations in the system remains unchanged. 
Concerning disability pensions, they are initially higher for men than for women, although
the gap is less important than in the case of retirement benefits. As is shown in Figure 5.6, the
temporal evolution depicts a clear trend toward reducing the gap in the average benefit by gen-
der: in the base year male average pension benefit represented 1.3 that of their women coun-
terpart, while in 2050 this proportion declines to 1.1. It is important to mention that just for
disability pensions the women have initially a higher proportion of new registrations to total
pensions than men. But that difference would decrease gradually and both proportions would
become equal around 2030. This evolution of the proportion of new registrations is the key
explanatory factor for the considerable decline of the gender gap in the average pensions until
2030. From that moment, this gap would tend remain constant (see Figure 5.3). 
As for widowhood benefits, the ratio of new registrations to total pensions is quite hig-
her for men than for women (se Figure 5.4). The main reason for this result is that total num-
ber of female pensions is superior to the male ones (in 2004 widowhood pension benefits
accruing to men represented about 7% of the total). The expected evolution of labour mar-
ket, with a considerable increase of women participation rates and employment, leads one to











































































































Figure 5.5. Evolution of average retirement benefit pension by gender.
Source: Own elaboration from MTAS (2005).
Note: Figures expressed in constant € of 2004 per month (without extraordinary payments).believe in a considerable increase of widower’s pensions. As the projection results show, the
latter’s relative importance is superior to that of the former. Despite the fact that men avera-
ge pension benefit is initially slightly inferior to that of women, because of their higher rates
of new registrations, widowhood average pension benefit for the former grows at a faster rate











































































































Figure 5.6. Evolution of average disability benefit pension by gender
Source: Own elaboration.
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Figure 5.7. Evolution of average pension benefit as a percentage of the productivity ratio 
(GDP per worker)
Source: Own elaboration.than that of the latter during great part of the projection period. Something similar occurs to
the rest of pensions accruing to survivors, where the ratio of new registrations is also infe-
rior for men and tends to become more important during the projection period. So, even
though initially the pension benefit is slightly superior for women, men pension benefits
would surpass it around 2010 and keep that position during the remaining projection period.
An interesting result is obtained by comparing the evolution of the average pension
benefit with respect to productivity ratio (GDP per worker). From Figure 5.7, one can deduct
that no important fluctuations of the disability and retirement pension benefits are to be
expected during the projection period. As to widowhood pension benefit, a slight increase is
observed during the first years. This would start decreasing steadily afterwards to eventually
reach, by 2050, an average pension benefit below 10% the average productivity versus the
15% maximum that it would reach in 2010. For the rest of the survivors’ pensions an initial
increase is also observed. This would continue until 2025 but would begin to decline after,
yet at a lower rate than that observed for widowhood.
5.3. Total pension expenditure
The results for the projection of contributory pension’s total expenditure for the spell
2004-2050 are shown in Table 5.3. Their evolution with respect to GDP can be captured in
Figure 5.8. It is expected that total pension expenditure in real terms will increase signifi-
cantly, at an average annual cumulative rate close to 3%. The important increase of the reti-
rement pensions stands out. These grow at a 3.4% annual rate and, given their relative impor-
tance, they determine the evolution of total expenditure (they represent 66% at the beginning
and are above 80% of total expenditure in 2050). 
It is however important to mention that the evolution of expenditure is non lineal during
the projection period. On the contrary, looking at the growth rate, different stages can be dis-
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Table 5.3
EVOLUTION OF CONTRIBUTORY PENSION EXPENDITURE BY CATEGORY
Retirement Disability Widow Other TOTAL
2004 42,546 66.2% 7,532 11.7% 13,125 20.4% 1,104 1.7% 64,307
2005 44,472 65.8% 8,199 12.1% 13,705 20.3% 1,178 1.7% 67,554
2010 52,414 65.8% 10,070 12.6% 15,631 19.6% 1,501 1.9% 79,617
2015 59,400 66.4% 11,863 13.3% 16,249 18.2% 1,898 2.1% 89,411
2020 70,732 67.9% 14,170 13.6% 16,956 16.3% 2,265 2.2% 104,124
2025 89,369 70.7% 16,364 12.9% 18,156 14.4% 2,604 2.1% 126,495
2030 114,581 73.7% 18,190 11.7% 19,925 12.8% 2,829 1.8% 155,527
2035 141,651 76.2% 19,426 10.5% 21,857 11.8% 2,935 1.6% 185,869
2040 172,763 79.0% 19,546 8.9% 23,483 10.7% 3,008 1.4% 218,800
2045 195,330 80.7% 18,809 7.8% 24,709 10.2% 3,112 1.3% 241,960
2050 199,223 80.9% 18,780 7.6% 25,068 10.2% 3,254 1.3% 246,320
Source: Own elaboration from MTAS (2005).
Note: Figures are expressed in millions of constant € of 2004, and as percentage of total.cerned. During the first part, approximately until 2020, the average annual cumulative rate of
growth is about 3% and would intensify to reach 3.8% after that year. During the last part of
the projection period, more or less from 2040, an inflection point can be observed in the varia-
tion rate, which would exhibit from that moment less significant values (some 1.2% between
2040 and 2050) or even becomes negative for some pension categories during specific periods. 
Once again, the evolution of retirement pensions determines the trend of global expendi-
ture. Until 2020 its growth is about 3.2% annually, compared with an average of 4.6% betwe-
en 2020 and 2040. This is without doubt due to the baby-boomers retirement (this was shown
in Figure 5.1). In the last years, it can be clearly observed that their decline starts to have an
echo on the rate of growth of expenditure, which is reduced to 1.4% on average between 2040
and 2050 (this rate is only 0.5% in the last five years). In the case of disability pensions,
expenditure grows significantly (around 4% annually) until 2020. From that moment the rate
of growth slows down (around 1.6% between 2020 and 2040) and becomes negative by 2039
(only in the last two years a slight positive growth rate, inferior to 0.5%, is observed). The
expenditure in survivor pensions to orphans and other family members exhibits an evolution
similar to that of disability. Only in the first half of the projection period one can observe sig-
nificant rates of growth, exhibiting on average some 4.6% annual cumulative rate between
2004 and 2020. After that period, the values are lower, although the variation rates are not
negative. Finally, expenditure in widowhood benefits grows less rapidly than the rest of the
categories. The average annual cumulative rate is 1.6% between 2004 and 2020 (to remain
basically unchanged between 2020 and 2040), while it goes down to 0.7% in the last ten years.
With respect to GDP, the total expenditure in contributory pensions will remain basically
constant until 2017 at a level about 8%, and will begin a sustained growth afterwards to reach
a maximum value of about 15% of GDP around 2045 (Figure 5.8). This figure is quite subs-
tantial given that the baseline scenario incorporates a recovery of employment and female
participation rates, which increase the denominator, the GDP. 
The present results could be altered by the recent agreement on Social Security pushed
by the Declaring for Social Dialogue (DSD)20. The current lack of micro data —and in some
cases the absence of detailed legal developments— precludes at the moment a rigorous
analysis of the potential effects of the agreement. Nevertheless, overall it is not expected to
solve the difficulties of the Spanish pensions system21. As previous reform attempts in line
with the Toledo agreement, this reform focuses on conflicting goals, namely consolidating
the system and improving its sustainability. As a consequence, although most measures are
attempted to reduce expenditure, inevitably some other are expected to increase it. But even
the former can have ambiguous effects. First, reform measures aiming at reducing expendi-
ture act reinforcing the relationship between contributions and benefits both in retirement
pensions and disability pensions, implying a clear, though reduced, cut in pension entitle-
ments22. Second, the effectiveness of measures addressed to prolong working life —both
penalising early retirement and rewarding delayed retirement— might be reduced by the
incentives associated with them. 
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Our results can now be compared with those obtained by other authors or in official
estimations. Figure 5.9 shows the ratio of pension expenditure to GDP for several recent
studies. Besides initial scale differences —due to the type of pension considered—, some
divergences on the projections remain, which might be explained by the set of assumptions
or by the modelling strategy. In this subsection we compare results of recent studies. The
focus will be on total retirement pensions because the rest of studies say little about the
modelling strategy for the rest of categories or about the gender differences. In any case, the
evolution of retirement expenditure is the main force governing the behaviour of total pen-
sion expenditure.
In fact, results may be sensitive to the assumptions underlying the demographic, macro-
economic and labour market scenarios. The following decomposition of the ratio of retire-
ment pensions expenditure to GDP —the main expenditure category— may illustrate the
sources of variation: 
= Dt · Ct · Rt · [5.1]
where Dt stands for the dependency rate, Ct for coverage ratio (defined as the number of pen-
sions to population aged 65+), Rt is the replacement rate (defined as the average pension
benefit divided by average labour productivity). The last term is the inverse of the product
















































































































Figure 5.8. Evolution of contributory pension expenditure as a percentage of GDP
Source: Own elaboration.lating the pure ageing effect —the increase in the dependency ratio— from the other factors,
in order to investigate different possibilities of reducing the strength of the increase in pen-
sion expenditure. 
The full decomposition is not available for all the above mentioned studies but we can
extract some tendencies. Our model captures movements in all those components. Besides
the usual doubling of D (from 25 to 67%), there is an increase in C (from 64,1 to 68,9%) due
to the rise in female participation rate.23 With respect to employment and participation rates,
as seen in Section 4, our scenario starts from a value of 61.2% and 68.6% to reach 68.6%
and 76.8% at the end, respectively. Finally, the factors driving the change in R are a key issue.
The mere projection of average entry pension using the legal formula coupled with the adjus-
tment of the rest of pensions according to the inflation rate, imply a limited growth of the
average pension benefit and hence a decline in R. Nevertheless, some other legal features of
the system, like the possibility of an evolution of maximum and minimum pensions below
or above inflation, should be taken into account. On the one hand, a constant ceiling on the
maximum pension —a simple updating with inflation— entails an implicit decrease in ave-
rage pensions in so far as there is an increase in the share of individuals reaching it. This


















Figure 5.9. Results of recent studies for the Spanish pensions system
Source: Own elaboration.
Note:  Initial year 2005 and final year 2050, except for Jimeno (2003) —2001 and 2040— and
Balmaseda et al. (2006) —2005 and 2045. Differences on the initial size of expenditure obey to pen-
sions considered: only retirement pensions (Jimeno, 2006); the whole social security contributory
system (MTAS, 2005; Balmaseda et al., 2006 and this model); or also contributory pensions given by
other public administrations (Alonso and Herce, 2003).seems to be the tendency in the Spanish system, as the maximum pension has decreased in
real terms in the last two decades. On the other hand, given that the adjustment of non-entry
pensions according to inflation implies a worsening of the relative position of those indivi-
duals receiving them, there have been discretional increases of minimum pensions above
inflation. Overall, the combination of these observed tendencies implies in our calculations
a slight decrease in the replacement rate from 20.5% to 19.2%. 
Jimeno (2003) and Balmaseda et al. (2006) show a similar decomposition and derive
scenarios based on different assumptions on the evolution of the four factors. In the former,
the increase from 5.6% to 10.6% in the ratio of retirement pension expenditure to GDP is
mainly explained by a pure ageing effect (i.e., associated with the change in D) to the extent
that both C and R are kept constant while there is a slight increase in ER. In our case a simi-
lar total increase is obtained but with an increase in C and a decrease in R which offset each
other. On the later the ratio of contributory pensions expenditure to GDP increases from
7.7% to 18%24. The higher value of total expenditure in retirement pensions is mainly due to
an increase in R from 18% to 22%25. 
MTAS’s (2005) results are similar to those reported in this paper, in spite of keeping R
almost constant and increasing C by a 4%. Finally, if we abstract from the different scale,
Alonso and Herce (2003), obtain a similar increase in pension expenditure, though the
decomposition in the four factors is not apparent26.
In the next Section alternative scenarios are presented. In order to evaluate the change in
sustainability with respect to the baseline case, we employ a synthetic indicator commonly
used in generational accounting. This indicator (which we will call sustainability indicator
SI) which summarizes in a single figure the sustainability of the system, measures the pre-
sent value of the expenditure as a fraction of the present value of GDP for the whole projec-
tion period (see Abío et al. 2005). The value of this indicator can be interpreted as the per-
centage of GDP that, on average and during the period of projection, has to be allocated to
the payment of contributory pensions on an annual basis. If we denote the discount rate d,








where TE is total expenditure, n is the final projection period (2050), and t represents the
year (t = 1,…,N). The comparison of the SI with the ratio of expected Social Security reve-
nues to GDP allows studying how sustainable is the pay-as-you-go system. In Table 5.4, the
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higher this is the lower the weight given to future flows. This entails that a scenario for which
the projection of future expenditure is characterized by sharp increments will have a value of
the SI that decreases as the discount rate increases. This applies to all pension categories but
widowhood benefits. The reason is the low projected growth for this specific category, which
is substantially less than that for the other categories.
As can be observed, the expenditure in retirement pensions would require, according to the
simulations, an annual average collection for its complete funding of 7.9% of GDP (for d= 3%)
or of 7.3% of GDP (for d = 5%), while in fact the effort currently exerted is significantly less,
some 5.1% of GDP. If we add the remaining expenditure categories, the need for funding of the
contributory pension system would on average be more than 10% of GDP during the projec-
tion period (while it is currently 7.7% of GDP). Additionally, this indicator also proves to be
very useful when comparing the results of the different sensitivity analyses proposed. 
6. Sensitivity analysis
With the purpose of studying how sensitive are the results of the base projection scenario
to changes in some of the key demographic and macroeconomic variables, five scenarios of
sensitivity analysis are provided. Firstly, a projection using two alternative hypotheses on pro-
ductivity growth (higher and lower than that in the base scenario) is implemented. Secondly,
in order to test the migration effects on the evolution of total expenditure, projections under
two alternative demographic scenarios are carried out. The first of them is associated with a
zero migration hypothesis. In the second one, the alternative hypothesis of migration flows
proposed by the INE is considered. Finally, we propose the projection under a scenario of gre-
ater labour market participation and employment of individuals older than 55 years. 
6.1. Productivity growth
The hypothesis on productivity used in the base scenario (see Figure 4.3) assumed a stea-
dily increasing evolution until 2012 where it would reach annual growth values superior to 2%
to later stabilize around 1.7%. In this exercise the sensitivity of the projection results to two
alternative productivity growth hypotheses is analysed. Under the high productivity hypothe-
sis, the maximum value would reach a 2.4% rate to stabilize around 2%. Under the low pro-
ductivity hypothesis, the maximum value would be below 2% and remain stable below 1.5%.
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Table 5.4
BASELINE RESULTS FOR THE SI PARAMETER
Retirement Disability Widow Other Survivors TOTAL
d = 3% 7.896 1.133 1.430 0.178 10.638
d = 5% 7.284 1.114 1.434 0.174 10.005
Source: Own elaboration.Changing the productivity hypothesis affects the evolution of expenditure just for the
average pension benefit. More specifically, it affects the evolution of the average pension
benefit of the new registrations but leaves invariable the number of pensions. Figure 6.1 pre-
sents the evolution of the ratio of total expenditure to GDP under the two alternative hypo-
theses. The effects of a higher or a lower evolution of productivity cannot be judged until
after 2020, which is the necessary delay for the productivity changes to be reflected in the
regulating bases for the new pensioners entering the system. As can be observed from the
synthetic indicator SI in Table 6.2, the effects of the changes in productivity are mirrored par-
ticularly in the retirement pension expenditure, whereas these effects are a lot less significant
for disability and survivors’ benefits.
6.2. Migration hypothesis
The effects of the migration hypothesis are firstly analysed by projecting the model
under the alternative scenario of zero migration. The effects of migration on pension expen-
diture would be produced both on the number of pensioners and the average pension benefit
alike. But, as can be observed in Figure 6.1 and Table 6.1, which give the evolution of the
expenditure and the results for the SI respectively, these effects are quite limited, probably
due to the low number of immigrants assumed.
Secondly, the effects of migration levels higher than those considered by EUROSTAT
are evaluated using the alternative demographic scenario elaborated by the INE. As discus-
sed in Section 4, the INE assumes a net migration flow above 250.000 per year, while the
baseline scenario posits a level of 100.000 per year at the end of this decade. In this case,
deviation of expenditure from baseline is much more important, as shown in Table 6.1.
Overall, this suggests that simulation results can be very sensitive to the migration hypothe-
sis as it usually happens in a defined benefit pensions system like the Spanish one. 
Nevertheless, note that we are only capturing the positive effects of migration. Those
occur in the short and medium term, as it increases workers and hence GDP. In the long term
it will also increase the pension needs though the time period considered in this study can
hardly capture this effect. Although some of the current immigrants might retire before the
106 JOAN GIL, MIGUEL A. LÓPEZ, JORGE ONRUBIA, CIÓ PATXOT, GUADALUPE SOUTO
Table 6.1
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS (SI VALUES)
Retirement Disability Widow Other Survivors TOTAL
Base 7.896 1.133 1.430 0.178 10.638
Low productivity 8.110 1.153 1.475 0.181 10.920
High productivity 7.677 1.113 1.385 0.175 10.350
No migration 7.925 1.114 1.430 0.178 10.647
High migration 7.321 1.079 1.314 0.174 9.888
High participation (over 55 years)  7.843 1.125 1.434 0.177 10.578
Note: The results are obtained assuming a 3% discount rate.
Source: Own elaboration.end of the projection period —2050— the positive effect on GDP of the 250.000 annual
immigrants still pushes the ratio expenditure to GDP far below the baseline scenario as
shown in Figure 6.1. Furthermore, due to a discounting effect, the SI strengths the weight of
the positive effect in the near future while it reduces the long term negative effect.
6.3. Greater labour market participation and higher employment of workers
older than 55 years 
An experiment considering a possible increase in the labour market participation and
higher employment of the workers older than 55 years is proposed. In particular, the baseli-
ne scenario assumes an increase to 63.9% at 2050 from initial 44.4% in the participation rate
of older workers, while in this sensitivity test we will suppose a higher growth reaching
69.0% at the end of period. This way we try to mirror one of the possible effects of increa-
sing working life due to a higher life expectancy along with the impact of a greater quality
of life, which would make the expansion of the effective working time viable. Although the
retirement age in Spain is 65 years, it is in this respect important to mention that the effecti-
ve retirement age is on average 62. As shown in Figure 6.1 however, the effect of this hypo-
thesis on expenditure is also quite limited since it hardly alters the course of the events des-
cribed in the base scenario. 
To some extent, this scenario gives account of the positive effects of delayed retirement
as long as the model links the path of entry pensions to the evolution of the participation rate.
The increase in participation increases employment and hence GDP, while it decreases
expenditure by delaying some entry pensions. Nevertheless, the fact that the simulated chan-
ge is only noticeable from 2030 on —and hence further reduced by discounting— explains
the surprisingly limited effect. In any case, a thorough account of this event requires taking















High participation rate High productivity
Figure 6.1. Pension spending as a percentage of GDP under alternative scenarios
Source: Own elaboration.into account the behavioural responses of agents and the negative effect on sustainability of
the legal incentives that should be enacted in order to achieve a delayed retirement age. 
7. Conclusions
The need for long-term fiscal projections is self-evident. Of these projections, pension
expenditures are one of the most important because firstly they represent a large share of
total expenditure, and secondly because of the close relationship between this variable and
demographic change. In this paper, after a state of the arts exposé, we develop a model to
project contributory pensions expenditures if the Spain Social Security System until 2050.
For that purpose we used the last demographic and macroeconomic scenarios developed by
Eurostat (2005). The model starts with a decomposition of total expenditure as a product of
the number of pensions and the average pension benefit. Later, we undertake a disaggrega-
tion by pension category, contribution regime to Social Security, gender, and age cohort.
Among the results obtained, one is of central importance: a substantial increase in total
expenditure for contributory pensions is to be expected. This would reach some 15% of GDP
around 2050 compared to a barely 8% in 2004. However, three stages are to be differentia-
ted in change. Thus, from 2004 until 2018-2020 approximately, total expenditure as a per-
centage of GDP would remain basically unchanged, but afterwards we would observe a ste-
ady increase until it reaches maximum values around 2045. From that year a gradual down-
ward tendency would set in. Taking into account the fact that important changes in the ratio
of average pension benefit to GDP per worker are not foreseen during the projection period,
the increase in expenditure would mainly be attributed to the growth of the number of bene-
ficiaries. In fact, the results show clearly that by 2050 the number of pensions would be more
than 14 million, compared to barely 8 million in 2004. This important increase is due prin-
cipally to the expected demographic evolution by age cohorts (in 2050 more than 35% of the
population would be 65 years old or more, compared to 16.8% in 2004). 
By pension categories, as the projection results show, the evolution of total expenditure is
driven by the evolution of retirement pensions. For instance, the coverage rate of retirement
pensions (the ratio of the number of pensions to the population 65 years old or more) would
increase by more than five percentage points during the projection period and would be around
70% in 2050. Although an increase in the number of beneficiaries for the rest of the pension
categories is also expected, this increase, in each and every case, is not important enough so
as to make them gain more importance with respect to total expenditure. Retirement pensions
in turn gain weight since they would represent almost 72% of total number of pension bene-
fits in 2050, against 58.6% in 2004. Consequently, the expenditure in retirement pensions
would be almost 81% of total contributory pensions in 2050, against 66% originally.
Meanwhile, total expenditure in all the other categories of pensions would lose weight. 
Interesting conclusions are also reached from the analysis of the results by gender. We
are referring to both the number of pensions and the average pension benefit. For instance,
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would expect, the projection shows a greater increase of the men pensions. Being basically
equal at the beginning (with 4 million pensions for both male and female), the number of
benefits allocated to male pensions would be 8 million against 6 million for women in 2050.
If we look at each pension type we can see that the initial female retirement pensions, which
represented only one third of the total, would grow more than male pensions, yielding an ave-
rage annual growth rate of 1.86% versus 1.71%, due to the increase in female participation.
Nevertheless as an indirect effect of this trend, it is expected that widower’s pensions grow
relatively more (an average annual growth rate of 2.5% is estimated for the number of men
pensions, compared to a barely 0.3% for widow’s pensions). Consequently, the absolute
increases that are observed in the number of female beneficiaries in all the pension catego-
ries would not suffice to inhibit a relative increase of the male pensions. The future entitle-
ment conditions of widowhood benefits will probably change this result as a consequence of
one of the purposes of the DSD —i.e., those benefits stay as a subsidiary income— but the
projection model needs to stick to constant legislation assumption. 
As far as the size of pension benefits is concerned, the model projects important chan-
ges in the original differences that exist in the various pension categories by gender. For the
widowhood benefits and the rest of pensions to survivors, the gender gap (the difference bet-
ween the average widow’s pension and the average widower’s pension) is initially favourable
to female, whose average pension starts at a level that is 10% superior to that of men.
Nonetheless, that gap would disappear before 2012. From that moment average pension
benefits by gender would remain very similar, and even the men pensions would be slightly
above. This is mainly attributable to the greater proportion of new registrations of men with
respect to total number of pensions. This brings the size of the pension benefit closer to the
growth of the contributory bases. For retirement pensions however, the average benefit allo-
cated to men starts by being 60% more than that allocated to women, but at the end of the
projection the excess is only 30%. The greater labour market participation of women along
with the tendency to wage equality would not be sufficient to bring the size of the benefits
by gender closer. The proportion of new registrations to total retirement pension beneficia-
ries is superior for men (due basically to higher life expectancy of women which keeps them
longer time in the system), which, despite a hypothetical equality in the contributory bases,
provokes a greater increase of the size of average benefits to men.
The ratio of the present value of the flows of total pension expenditure to the present
value of GDP is frequently used as an indicator to assess the sustainability of public finan-
ces. This index is very useful as a synthetic indicator of sustainability (SI) as well as to cap-
ture variations among the different sensitivity scenarios. In our base scenario (and for dis-
count rates between 3% and 5%), the model forecasts a value for SI superior to 10%.
Regarding the sensitivity analysis, in this paper we have considered how the simulation
results vary under changes in: (1) productivity growth, (2) migration, and (3) the labour mar-
ket participation of individuals of age 55 and older. With respect to (1), a greater or lower
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to the fact that the increases in the contributory bases require some time before they have any
effect on the new registrations pensions. Assuming a 3% discount rate, a greater (lesser) pro-
ductivity growth rate reduces (increases) the value of the SI from 10.6 to 10.3% (10.9).
Regarding (2), consideration of high migration flows reduces the baseline results in a sizea-
ble way. In fact, migration flow is the variable that has the greatest impact on the projection
results given the current design of the benefit formula on a defined benefit bases. Finally, an
alternative scenario considering a greater participation for older workers (over age 55) has
been carried out to evaluate the effects of prolonging working life. 
The availability of long-term fiscal projections is a necessary condition for the introduc-
tion of reforms in the areas of public action. On the contrary, the lack of these projections
can allow necessary reforms to be avoided or deferred. This paper tries to palliate the need
to have long-term projections specifically for contributory pension expenditure, which is in
absolute term one of the most important rubric of public expenditure in welfare. 
Notes
1. See EPC (2006) for the last report.
2. As Baekgaard (2002) points out, without interactions with some sort of macro model, most non behavioural
microsimulation models can simply be regarded as huge and very complicated accounting models.
3. For instance, Rojas (2005) includes income inequality as a source of heterogeneity while Jimeno (2003) con-
siders heterogeneity through the simulation of working careers.
4. There is also a residual scheme under extinction, called SOVI, consisting of old-age and disability pension
benefits.
5. It is worth noting first that contributory bases for the 24 months immediately prior to the date of retirement
are taken by their nominal value, while the rest are updated according to the evolution of the CPI; second wor-
ker’s contributory bases are bounded every year by virtue of the General Budget Act. For instance, in the
General Regime these bases are subject to a minimum and maximum limit depending on the professional cate-
gory of the worker. However, there is just one upper and lower limit in the Special Self-Employed Regime and
Agrarian Regime (for self-employed workers). In case of the Domestic Employees and the Agrarian (salaried
workers) Regimes contributory bases are fixed. Second that the 15 years correspond to 4.700 effective days
instead of 5.475 because extraordinary payment days are computed (This is one of the changes introduced by
the DSD as seen later)
6. The requirements are: i) retirement from age 61; ii) a minimum effective contribution period of 30 years (at
least 2 years must be within the last 15 years of the working career); iii) to be registered as a job seeker and
iv) a job termination not been caused by reasons of the worker’s free will.
7. The following three requirements, must be simultaneously met: b.1) if the widow has dependent relatives and
simultaneously the annual family income per capita does not exceed 75% of the minimum wage; b.2) this pen-
sion is the sole or primary source of income for the beneficiary; b.3) the pensioner’s annual income from all
sources can not exceed a certain limit.
8. If the deceased was under partial retirement, the RB corresponding to the period of part-time work will be
taken into account, increased up to 100% of the amount that would have applied if the worker had been emplo-
yed full-time during that period.
110 JOAN GIL, MIGUEL A. LÓPEZ, JORGE ONRUBIA, CIÓ PATXOT, GUADALUPE SOUTO9. In particular: a) remarriage, b) having been found guilty, in a final sentence, of originator’s death, c) when it
is proven that the worker who disappeared in an accident did not die and d) conviction with a final sentence,
of committing a felony of aggravated homicide in any of its forms, or injuries, when the victim was the spou-
se or ex-spouse, except when, where appropriate, they had been reconciled.
10. Following Blanco, A., Montes, J., and Antón, V . (2001a and 2001b).
11. For that we have to assume that no withdrawal occurs among the new registrations, since data for a precise
measurement are not available. Any error margin in the estimates can be construed as negligible, for the per-
centage of withdrawals from the new registrations of the same period is less than 1%. Moreover, we confine
this assumption to computing the number of common pensions each year. So, its use is not extended to the
whole projection model.
12. As noted in Section 2, the past contributory bases are updated from the third year on.
13. Notice that, contrary to the computation of the common pensions, it is not necessary to assume that there exist
no withdrawals among the new registrations. 
14. In practice, as noted in Section 2, total permanent disability can be of two types depending on the percentage
to be applied to RB to obtain the pension benefit. So, the three initial degrees are transformed in four in the
projection exercise. 
15. Disaggregated information is not available, so we had to have recourse to an imputation procedure. For ins-
tance, to disaggregate according to the cause of the disability we used the INE ‘Encuesta Sobre
Discapacidades, Deficiencias y Estados de Salud’ (1999) to obtain a proportion by gender and age cohort of
the disabilities caused by common disease and non-workplace accident.
16. However, it is important to mention that substantial differences exist between contribution regimes to Social
Security (Agrarian, Sea and Charcoal have the highest disability rates) and also by age cohorts (the rates are
higher as the age comes close to retirement). 
17. The computation is done for the period 1999-2003, using for each age cohort the mean value throughout the
period.
18. Since the absolute permanent disability can give place to two different percentages to be applicable to the RB
(55% on general basis, and 75% when the beneficiary accomplish 55 years and is not working), the three pos-
sible degrees of disability considered are converted into four when estimating the average pension benefit. 
19. As explained in Section 2, this percentage goes up to 72% whenever some special requirements are met
20. Proyecto de Ley de Medidas en Materia de Seguridad Social approved by the government on the 13th of
February 2007. This reform was pushed by the declaration for social dialogue (DSD) —Declaración para el
Diálogo Social — subscribed first on July 2004 by the government, unions and employer’s organizations.
21. The availability of micro data set in Spain is improving. In particular, the Social Security Administration has
recently elaborated a micro database from its administrative records. This database can be very useful in the
near future, once adapted to research needs. As an example, the number of contribution years, which becomes
crucial in the evaluation of the main cutting expenditure proposals for reform, is not currently collected for
disability pensions and has many missing values in the case of retirement pensions.  
22. In particular in retirement pensions the minimum contribution period is increased to effective 15 years, 5,475
days, instead of the current 4,700 days. In the case of disability benefits, there are several measures: First, a
new minimum period of contribution is established for those aged less than 31. Second, a modification is intro-
duced in the calculation of pension benefit originated by common disease that reinforces the link between con-
tributions and benefits. In this case, before applying to the RB the percentage associated with the disability
degree, and additional percentage is introduced, which —analogously to the retirement pensions— depends
on the number of contributed years. Finally, with regard to complete disability pensions, a change in the cal-
culus of the complement to pay for the assistance is proposed. Instead of the present 50% additional to the
100% of the RB, this complement is the sum of two components: a) the 25% of the RB and b) the 50% of the
A projection model of the contributory pension expenditure of the spanish social security system: 2004-2050 111prevailing minimum contributory base. It is worth noting that the later can increase expenditure, in some con-
tribution regimes.
23. Note that the increase in female participation has two opposite effects. On the one hand it increases C, worse-
ning sustainability and, on the other hand, it increases employment improving it. Furthermore the closing of
the gender pension gap modelled may push up female future pension benefits but not necessarily the replace-
ment rate.
24. Recall that the reference year is 2045 in this case.
25. Jimeno (2003) also derives a similar alternative scenario. In fact the two studies take quite different approa-
ches. Jimeno (2003) uses hypothetic heterogeneous working careers in order to investigate the effect of those
differences in inequality, while Balmaseda et al (2006) make discretionary adjustments in the ratio average
pension to average productivity, in order to investigate the effect of those changes in pension expenditure. 
26. Studies based on previous years usually give a higher value of expenditure to GDP mostly due to the recent
improvement in employment, the huge entry on immigrants and the recent change in GDP calculations. See
also Abío et al. (2005), which estimate the sustainability of pensions system together with the whole Spanish
budget using generational accounting.
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Resumen
La necesidad de realizar proyecciones fiscales a largo plazo es evidente y se acentúa en el caso del gasto en pensio-
nes. En primer lugar porque éste representa una parte importante del gasto total, y en segundo lugar, debido a su
fuerte dependencia del envejecimiento demográfico. En este artículo elaboramos un modelo para proyectar el gasto
en pensiones contributivas del sistema de Seguridad Social español, desagregando los resultados por tipo de pen-
sión, sexo y régimen de cotización. 
Entre los resultados obtenidos el más destacable es el aumento esperado del gasto total en pensiones contributivas.
Éste rondará el 15% del PIB hacia 2045, partiendo de un valor inicial cercano al 8%, a pesar de que el escenario de
referencia incorpora una recuperación sustancial del empleo y de la participación laboral femenina. Por tipo de pen-
sión, las pensiones de jubilación son las que determinan la pauta de evolución del gasto total. Del análisis por sexos
se obtienen también conclusiones interesantes. Por ejemplo, incluso teniendo en cuenta el aumento en pensiones de
jubilación de las mujeres con motivo de su mayor participación laboral, el aumento correspondiente de las pensio-
nes de viudedad de los hombres acaba produciendo un aumento mayor del número total de pensiones recibidas por
hombres.
Palabras clave: Sistema de pensiones, sostenibilidad, gasto público. 
Clasificación JEL: E62, H55.
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